Chapter 7
In Chapter 7, Pannenberg
will explore his perspective on the doctrine of creation of the world. In terms
of a systematic presentation of Christian teaching, creation is the beginning
of the historical activity of God.[1]
Of course, as we have learned thus far, the Trinitarian God has already been
active within divinity in the relationship of Father, Son, and Spirit. Love
defines this activity. Creation involves the turning of the loving activity
that has occurred within God outward toward things clearly not divine.
One of the
obstacles for many young people today is that the church seems to fight a
battle against science. Many youth accept as a given the big bang and
evolution. They assume Adam and Eve are mythic figures. Pannenberg provides a
path for the church to embrace such notions while affirming that God created
the world that science describes. For many persons, reading a theologian who
can converse respectfully with science, and especially with the dominant
theories of evolution and the big bang, to some degree agreeing they are true
explanations of the way the world works, should be refreshing.
The difference
with Karl Barth in Volume 3.1 of his Church
Dogmatics (1945, 1958) is vast at this point. Barth will be content with an
exposition of the two creation accounts in Genesis. His reason is that the
material of theology is the exposition of the Word of God as the revelation of
God. Barth will even admit that another theologian might want to interact with
science. He did not need feel a need to do so. Maybe Barth simply recognized a
limit in his personal interests here. In any case, Pannenberg will refer to the
authors of Lux Mundi (1899), to A. N.
Whitehead, and to Henri Bergson as providing valuable theological roots for
affirming the continuing creative activity of God that an expanding universe
and evolution suggest. Karl Barth could have considered such texts, but he
chose not to do so. He wanted to give no credence to natural theology. Yet, in
Volume 3.2, he will interact deeply with existentialist philosophers Heidegger,
Sartre, and Jaspers. Barth has the capacity to study what human beings say
about their world, and show how Jesus Christ sheds light on the matter. Thus, I
think Pannenberg is right when he says that the approach of Barth is an escape
from the modern experience of the world. Moltmann will explore his notion of
creation in God in Creation (1983,
1995) in which, while he goes through a very different intellectual journey,
ends up in a similar place as does Pannenberg. Peter C. Hodgson will also take
a similar approach to what we find from Pannenberg.[2]
Pannenberg wrote “Theological Questions to Scientists,” in The Sciences and Theology in the Twentieth Century (1981). He wrote
essays in Toward a Theology of Nature:
Essays on Science and Faith (1993), edited by Ted Peters. In another volume
edited by Ted Peters in Science &
Theology: The New Consonance (1998) he wrote, “Human Life: Creation Versus
Evolution?” Pannenberg will also refer to the writings of Ian Barbour and A. R.
Peacocke in this chapter. He appreciates the writings of Teilhard de Chardin as
well. Acquaintance with the authors mentioned here would be helpful to the
reader of this long chapter.
The reader of this
chapter will need to have a good acquaintance with Big Bang theory and with the
theory of evolution. However, the point Pannenberg is making is that the God of
the biblical witness could have created such a world. He is not making the
point that he can “prove” that God created this world. As we have explored his
methodology, we have learned he takes seriously the modern experience of the
world, and that includes its science. He is taking physics and biology of this
time seriously. One of the difficult issues here is the category of purpose. He
will want to distinguish between the orientation of the universe toward
increasing complexity from the notion of purpose. He will also view the radical
contingency of the universe as in line with the Christian notion of creation. He
will challenge the modernist notion of the Copernican revolution, which has
removed earth and humanity from central concern. As one of my book discussion
participants put it, he stands the Copernican revolution on its head by
restoring humanity to a central part in the unfolding history of the universe.
In Part I, Pannenberg
will explore the notion of creation as the act of God. In Section 1, Pannenberg
explores the notion of the outward action of God. Toward the end of Volume I,
Pannenberg discussed the notion of God engaging in action. The origin of the
world is in the free action of God, and is therefore contingent, in that it
might not have existed. If we take seriously the notion of the Trinity as
already engaging in actions of Father, Son, and Spirit, creation becomes an
outpouring of divine activity outside of this inner relation. Therefore, God is
active by nature and eternally, apart from the specific act of creation.
Creation is not a different type of divine activity. Rather, as the Trinity is
a relation of divine activity within the divine, so creation is a turn of this
divine activity outward. The importance of the Trinity is that one can avoid
the question that puzzled Origen. Origen speculated that if God is Creator,
then God must have always created, and therefore the world always existed. One
also avoids the issue of Richard Rothe, who thought that if the world has a
beginning, one must think of God as not being Creator at some point.[3]
The Trinity becomes the basis of relations between the Creator and the
creatures. When we consider the notion of ends and means, we need not view God
as a needy and dependent being. The unity of the series of temporal events in
creation has its basis in the end. Finite events and beings in their temporal
sequence refer to a future fulfillment. The destiny of creaturely occurrence
has its orientation toward fellowship with God. In that sense, God chooses to
become dependent on creaturely conditions for the manifestation of the
Trinitarian relations. Each creature has a part in the saving purpose of the
Father. Creation embraces the themes of reconciliation, redemption, and
consummation.
In Section 2 of
Part I, Pannenberg explores the nature of creation. Genesis begins with the
notion of dating the covenant history of Yahweh back to creation. He disagrees
with J. van Seters and suggests that the Patriarchs had the notion of El, which
would combine with the later new revelation of Yahweh. The notion of Yahweh as
active in the history of Israel led to further reflection on the religion of
the Patriarchs and further, to the notion of the activity of God in creation.
Once again, II Isaiah is central in his argument, as he based his expectation
of a new saving action on the part of Yahweh on the past actions of Yahweh in
history and creation. This raises the question of whether one should limit
creation to the beginning. Given scientific theories today, it seems reasonable
to say that God is creative, continuing to create, recreating, and sustaining
the covenant contained in creation.[4]
He admits that the Genesis story gave classical expression to the unrestricted
nature of the power of God in creation. The idea that creation occurred through
the power of the divine Word, just as the prophets referred to the divine Word,
has a mythical origin. The Word is not unique here, but what seems to be unique
is the unlimited freedom of God in the biblical view of creation. He refers to
the notion of creation out of nothing as having its origin in Theophilus of
Antioch and Irenaeus of Lyons. He rejects both Barth and Moltmann in their
attempts to give “nothing” a reality that God had to overcome. This also
separates the Bible from Plato’s account in Timaeus as well as the view of
Whitehead, all of whom he describes as dualistic. He is sympathetic to the
notion of God working by persuasion as similar to his exposition of the
patience and kindness of God as God works toward the destiny of creation. He is
cautious in that it restricts the power of God, suggesting that the creature
does not depend fully upon God. However, the question I would have here is that
if creation is not simply an echo of the divine, then is it not true creatures
need to receive help from other finite things? He also thinks that Genesis 1
moves against any monistic (Spinoza and Hegel) notion of creation, which would
suppose that creation occurred by necessity. He wants to hold together the
freedom of the divine origin of the world with that of God holding fast to
creation. Divine love is the link between them. Divine love and divine freedom
belong together. He has already shown the Trinitarian notion of divine love,
which provides the basis of a doctrine of creation. Moltmann (God in Creation Chapter 4) will also
part company with Barth in shifting the focus from the freedom of God to the
loving expression of the nature of God. God is free to be who God is. God is
creative, and therefore creates.
Thus, in Section 3
of Part I, Pannenberg explores the Trinitarian origin of the act of creation.
He will point to science agreeing with the notion of the contingency of the
world. He will also explore the notion of divine love as the origin, that which
sustains, and that which will not let go of the finitude of creation until
creation reaches its consummation. He rejects resolving these issues by
referring to the eternal decree of God, as he finds in Moltmann and Barth.
Rather, theology has to develop the thought that the creation of the world is
an expression of divine love, as Moltmann affirms, but must do so along
Trinitarian lines. I must say that my initial reading of Moltmann is different,
as he is very Trinitarian in his notion of creation. As for the decree,
Moltmann modifies this by combining it with the notion of emanation. For Pannenberg,
the existence of the world is an expression of the goodness of God. The Son is
the object of the love of the Father and is the basis for all that is different
from God. The self-distinction of the Son from the Father is out of humility,
rather than the pride we will find in humanity as it sought separation from
God. He refers to Karl Rahner and his notion of Incarnation for support in this
notion. Although materially, he is close to the distinction Barth makes between
the external and internal basis of the covenant, the effect is quite different (Church Dogmatics III.1, 41.2/3). The
existence of the eternal Son is the basis of the distinction and independent
existence of all creaturely reality. Jesus put his own existence in the service
of the glorifying of God. In another book, Pannenberg will bring creation and
eschatology together. His point is that the essence of a thing has not always
existed. The essence of a thing is what becomes of it as it finds its ultimate
illumination, place, and definition, in light of the entirety of creation. For
the Christian, the essence of a thing finds its determination based on their
orientation to Christ. It will have a proleptic structure, and is therefore
inadequate and provisional. It will have metaphorical meaning.[5]
Humanity put its existence into revolt from God. I have already directed the
attention of the reader to the discussion in Anthropology in Theological Perspective 62ff, 66ff for the notion
of being oneself with another. This discussion becomes a way of understanding
the relations within the Trinity. He sees the notion of the eternal Son as
having its basis in the Jewish notion of preexistent wisdom. Creation will have
its consummation in Jesus Christ, which presupposes that creation owes its
existence to Christ as well. He modifies Hegel at this point. Hegel pointed to
the necessity of the emergence of the principle of otherness in the Son.
However, Pannenberg wants to refer to the mutuality of the relations of the
Trinitarian persons. The divine life is a self-enclosed circle, which needs no
other outside itself. Creation is the free act of God because it flows from the
free agreement of the Son with the Father through the Spirit. He refers to the
biblical witness that the Spirit is the origin of life. Continued creaturely
existence is possible by participation in God, which is the special work of the
Spirit. As he sees it, the stages of the evolution of life are the stages of
its increasing complexity and intensity and therefore growing participation in
God. A mark of the organic life is that it has an inner relation to the future
of its own changes and its spatial environment. He sees this in the
developmental thrust of plants and the instinctive life of animals. This
self-transcendence results in internalizing the future of the organism. He
refers to Henri Bergson and Teilhard de Chardin as partners in this view of
evolution. Moltmann (God in Creation,
Chapter 1) will also say that knowledge of nature as the creation of God is
participating knowledge, which means that the theologian focuses upon the
complex way the finite things of creation relate to each other. He also refers
to the future of creation as the glory of God and that the Spirit preserves
life and brings life to its goal. The presence of the divine Spirit means
self-transcendence will make nature open to its future and achieve its goal. Pannenberg
finally makes it clear, then, that creation is not a notion that theology
should reserve for the beginning. Preservation goes with creation. Therefore,
creation is a living occurrence, continued creation, a constantly new creative
fashioning. The action of God is a single act that embraces the whole cosmic
process. He is in agreement with Moltmann (God
in Creation, Chapter 8). The action of God includes many individual acts
and phases. It leaves room for a plurality of creatures. Moltmann (God in Creation Chapter 4) will stress
that God creating by “letting-be” or making room. I am not sure what to make of
his idea that God creates by withdrawing the presence of God in order to make
room for others, opening the door for a discussion of “nothingness.” Its basis
is Jewish speculation that seems like an unfounded mystification of the
subjection, according to Pannenberg. Robert
Jensen will stress that God opens room and therefore creates. The roominess of
God becomes the context of creation as divine life embraces it.[6]
The creatures in their plurality can participate in the movement of the divine
action that fills creation. It does so through the taking shape of the Word and
in the moving of the Spirit.
In Section 4 of
Part I, the final section, Pannenberg explores the creation, preservation, and
rule of the world by God.
In subsection (a)
of Section 4, he explores preservation and creation. Paul Tillich defines God as
creative. The doctrine of creation serves the purpose of exploring the meaning
of human finitude as well as the meaning of the rest of finite things. Tillich
will carry out his discussion of creation in the context of his notion of time,
and thus, as originating, sustaining, and consummating aspects of his doctrine
of creation.[7]
Tillich prefers to think in terms of continuous creation. The sustaining power
of God is in the basic structures of reality. It refers to that which continues
within change. Without this static element, the finite could never gain
self-identity. “The faith in God's sustaining creativity is the faith in the
continuity structure of reality as the basis for being and acting.”[8] Moltmann
(God in Creation Chapter 4) will
suggests that Tillich, by saying that creation is identical with the divine
life, abolishes the self-differentiation of God from the world, and thus
becomes monistic and pantheistic. For Pannenberg, the concept of the
preservation of creation implies it does not owe its existence to itself. God
wills to preserve creation. He refers to Augustine (City of God 11.6), who said that God created with time, and not in
time. Barth (Church Dogmatics III.1,
67-70) affirms creation in time. He agrees with Barth that eternity is the
source of time. Pannenberg thinks that Augustine preserves the notion that
creation is not an arbitrary resolve of God and that it opposes any restriction
of the divine action in creation to the beginning of the world. Such
preservation by God means God remains faithful to creation, and therefore
preserves its independence. He has already shown in referring to II Isaiah that
continuing creation does not contradict the notion in Genesis 2:1 that the work
of creation is finished. Creation is a unique act that constitutes time and the
various phases of creation, while preservation always occurs in time. He
concludes this sub-section with a brief discussion of miracles. He affirms
Augustine, who saw miracles as our limited knowledge of the order God had
created. He also agrees with Schleiermacher, who said miracle is the religious
name for an event. Every event becomes a miracle once one relates it to the
Infinite. In reality, the fact of the order of nature, its regularities and
enduring constructs, is genuinely astounding.
In subsection (b)
of Section 4, Pannenberg explores the divine cooperation in the activities of
creatures. He begins with the traditional distinction between concursus and
conservatio, which modern theology has thrown into doubt. The point of this
distinction is that God does not leave creatures to themselves, while
recognizing that such cooperation does not mean that creatures may not deviate
from the purpose of God. He will explore the principle of inertia in this
regard. He notes that Spinoza used this principle to refer to the notion of
self-preservation of the creatures. He missed the notion that self-preservation
does not guarantee the continuation of the creature or of nature. Rather,
self-preservation refers to preservation by another. The identity of individual
things has its formation in the process of persisting. In another work,
Pannenberg refers to the way such persisting occurs in the human being through
hope and trust in reference to the future. The identity of the person becomes
the time-bridging present.[9]
In the final
subsection (c) of Section 4, Pannenberg discusses world government and the
kingdom of God as the goal of creation. Paul Tillich will refer to this
as the directing creativity of God through the freedom of humanity and through
the spontaneity and structural wholeness of all creatures. It works through
individual and social forms of human life. It works through any resistance to
divine activity. This affirmation asserts with faith that no situation can
frustrate the fulfillment of one’s ultimate destiny, that nothing can separate
the individual from the love of God in Christ.[10] To return to Pannenberg, here
is an attempt of the tradition to describe how God orders events so that they
achieve the ends for which God created them. The goal is both rendering to God
the glory due God and to reflect the goodness of which they are capable.[11]
He agrees with Barth (Church Dogmatics III.3,
41, 19, 186) that world government refers to the faithfulness of God in the
changes of created reality. The concern of world governance is for the world as
a whole, but therefore, must deal with the parts in relation to each other.
Every creature is an end in the work of creation and for world governance. The
objection to this is that the actual direction of the world and its history
offers little evidence of a God of love, mercy, and justice. He refers to the
presence of the absurdity of meaningless suffering as a strong objection. Barth
rightly points us to the royal dominion of the God of Israel to which the Old
Testament witnesses. Jesus had a message that had its start in the statement of
the future being near at hand. He reminds us of the tension between present
concealment and the future of the royal rule of God over the world. The
question he raises is whether divine world government has a direction or a
final structure of action. In what sense can we see this preceding rule in the
world as oriented to the future consummation of the world? Irenaeus (Against All Heresies, iv. 20. 7) said
that the glory of God is the living human person and the life of a person is
the vision of God. For Aristotelian Scholasticism, God is the final goal of the
action of God. The older Protestant dogmatics said the goal of God in creation
is to receive glory. He objects that God does not need this. God would become a
model for the behavior of self-seeking or love of self that is sinful among
human beings. Robert Jensen will agree with Jonathan Edwards that the final
goal of creation is God and the creatures God has made united in Christ.[12]
World government is also an expression of divine love that has as its content
the consummation of creation. God receives glory as individuals find their
fulfillment in their destiny. He offers a summary of Section 4, Part I (p.
57-59). He will stress that the central theme of divine world government is the
supremacy of God over the misuse of creaturely independence. World government
contradicts the claim made by wickedness and evil that they can oppose the will
of God as Creator. Thus, even the consequences of creaturely revolt from the
Creator finally have to serve the purpose of God for creation. The skill of God
in government shows itself in the divine ability to bring good even out of
evil.
In Part II,
Pannenberg discusses the world of creatures. He will want to interpret creation
as the work of the Trinitarian God. He is not offering a proof for the
existence of God. He is not saying one can read off the scientific description
of the world and discover God. What he wants to do from an apologetic
perspective is to argue that one can read the scientific description of the
world as a work or action of God. He thinks we have here a theme of the utmost
importance for the question of the truth of the Christian faith. Theology
cannot avoid describing the world of nature and human history as the creation
of God. Theology can do this only in dialogue with the sciences. For him, a
failure to claim that the world that the sciences describe is the world God has
made is a conceptual failure to confess the deity of the God of the Bible. In
the process, theology cannot ignore what the sciences have to say about the
world. He refers to Ian Barbour (Issues
in science and Religion) and A. R. Peacocke (Creation and the World of Science). He thinks failure here leads to
Docetism. Of course, Pannenberg is opposing Barth here. Moltmann (God in Creation, Chapter 3) opines that
Barth does not give sufficient attention to the way in which creation is a
sketch or design of the rule of God. Created things are promises of the rule of
God and the rule of God is a fulfillment of both the historical and natural
promise of God. Moltmann wants to restore the notion of vestiges or traces of
God in creation. Our experience of the world, properly understood, is an
anticipation that widens to a future or destiny of fellowship with God.
In Section 1 of
Part II, Pannenberg will explore plurality and unity in creation.
Theoretically, God could have created one thing outside the divine realm.
However, considering the magnitude of God, it would be a small thing for God to
do that. Once God decided to create freely and out of love, it meant a world of
creatures. Finite things find their limit in their relation to other finite
things, then, and not just in relation to the Infinite. The cosmology of
science today is relativist. It traces the beginning of creation before finite
time, for which one can read Paul Davies, God
and the New Physics, 9ff, 25ff. It also traces the plurality of finite
things to a big bang and the expansion of the universe. Such expansion requires
space and temporality. It also carries with it the idea of openness to the
future. Finite things develop their identity in relation to other finite
things, out of which we observe the unity of the universe, in which one can see
theologically the working of wisdom and the Logos. This Logos transcends finite
things and is immanent in finite things. We see the order in the natural law
that governs the interaction of phenomena. The Logos manifests itself in the
actual unfolding of the world. The universe has a history. The importance of
this is that the Christian view of the Incarnation means the Logos appeared on
friendly turf in Jesus of Nazareth. It does not represent a divine or alien
invasion. The Son reveals the destiny of each creature to honor the Father.
Creation and divine preservation show themselves in natural law. He refers us
to A. R. Peacocke, Science and the
Christian Experiment (1971, 21-22). This uniformity, however, has its
balance in chance and the contingency of events. He refers us to Ian Barbour, Issues in science and Religion, p. 298,
303ff. Israel saw the action of God in its history as giving meaning to the
contingent events of history. The analogy here is that the natural laws of science
assume the contingency of natural events. He refers to T. F. Torrance (“Divine
and Contingent Order,” The Sciences and
Theology in the Twentieth Century 1981, edited by A. R. Peacocke). In a
different book, Pannenberg will make the point that natural and historical
studies are equally distant descriptions of reality. He refers to T. S. Kuhn (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
1967, p. 192), who showed that scientific theories offer the best attempt to
describe the evidence at hand. One could use such a notion for historical
hypotheses as well. Of course, this means that psychology and philosophy can
develop meaningful statements.[13]
The contingency of events expressed in the laws of quantum physics and
thermodynamics are an exception to the laws of regularity. Yet, regularity is
the basis for the emergence of enduring forms. Of course, one could use the
regularity of nature as an argument against the Christian claim of God as
Creator. He refers to J. Polkinghorne, One
World: The Interaction of Science and Theology, 1986, 71-2. One can also
see the regularity as a reflection of the faithfulness of God as Creator and
Sustainer. In other words, once again, one does not have to read science in an
atheistic way. Moltmann (God in Creation Chapter
8) will also refer to the materialistic view of the world that arises out of
evolutionary theory. He will also argue that evolution suggests the
interrelation of all things. It becomes participatory, anticipatory, and open,
thereby becoming open to God. The point for Pannenberg is that the processes of
nature are open and communal systems that allows new forms and therefore a new
totality to emerge. As Moltmann (God in
Creation Chapter 1) stresses, such awareness of the immanence of God moves
us away from domination and toward a more communal notion that will have
ethical implications. The persistence and perishing of forms contributes to a
new totality. He directs us to Ian Barbour again. He also directs us to J. D.
Barrow and F. I. Tipler, The Anthropic
Principle (1986), 302ff. He also refers us to Whitehead, with whom he
agrees that the meaning of individual occasions emerges within the process of
relation. The temporality of such occasions means that by anticipation the
occasion has future relevance for others. Aristotle also suggested the future
goal must allow us to reinterpret the present.[14]
Modern science has opened the universe to the continuing creativity of God.
However, are humans the goal of creation? The Incarnation would imply as much.
Yet, science has shown that earth is hardly the center of the universe. Even on
earth, can we assume that evolution ends with us? If there are other
intelligent beings in the universe, this does not threaten the Christian
teaching.
In Section 2 of
Part II, Pannenberg discusses the Spirit of God and the dynamic of natural
occurrence.
In subsection (a),
he discusses the biblical starting point. He points out that that the biblical
witness is that the Spirit of God is the life-giving principle, to which all
creatures owe life, movement, and activity, especially with Psalm 104:30. He
admits that a first glance at the Bible puts it at odds with modern opinions.
In subsection (b),
Pannenberg discusses force, field, and Spirit. He notes that the description of
forms of movement and forces is the central theme of physics today. It has
developed the concept of force or energy working on bodies and thus producing
movement. He refers to the development of field theories that see a close link
between force and space-time. The metaphysical background of such theories is
Stoicism. Movement arises out of the
field of energy. Bodies emerge out of the field of energy. Thus, the field
unites all movement in the universe. What he wants to say is that
theologically, we can understand this field as the immanent working of the
divine Spirit. His point is that field theory brings modern science and the
biblical witness regarding the Spirit into close connection. Moltmann (God in Creation, Chapter 1) refers to
this as creation in the Spirit, as the Spirit preserves life and brings life to
its goal. This aspect of his theological program will us ethically to move away
from hierarchical and domination themes to communal themes.
In subsection (c),
Pannenberg works with the notion of space and time as aspects of the working of
the Spirit. The transcendence of God requires space. In creating, God gives
creatures space alongside God, while still embracing them. The perception of
space and time is a way of sensing the Infinite. When we explore time, we have
to deal with the constitutive significance of simultaneity. Space-time is a
multidimensional continuum. Relative simultaneity is that which is not
simultaneous in itself. Augustine had the insight that for God to have
creatures, God needed to take time for them. This led him to reflect upon time.[15]
Augustine described this as the present that bridges time in his Confessions (Book 11). God is with every
creature as its own place, since God is omnipresent. He has already shown that
eternity is the undivided presence of life in its totality. Eternity is a
present that comprehends all time and has no future outside itself. Eternity
constitutes the experience and concept of time. He has previously referred to
Plotinus for this insight. He refers positively to Moltmann, God in Creation as well in a way that
suggests substantial agreement. He does not think that the eschatological
consummation will bring disappearance of the distinction that occurs in cosmic
time. Yet, the separation will cease when creation participates in the eternity
of God. He admits that the future toward which finite things move has for them
an ambivalent face. They have little control. The future threatens an end to their
independent existence. Yet, he has already shown that the future is the field
of the possible. He has already discussed the openness of creation to new
forms, which is the dynamic of the divine Spirit in creation. In another work, he
writes that in the light of the idea of a creative eschaton, being achieves an intrinsic relation to the future and
pushes forward to new forms of participation in the creative origin of all
being. Humanity is the only being aware of this future orientation.[16]
In another work, Pannenberg discusses Plotinus as the origin of the idea of the
primacy of the future, a theme that Heidegger explores as the means for
attaining the wholeness of individual existence. In Augustine, time becomes the
song that allows individual things to participate in eternity. In this way,
duration is the synthesis of the flow of time. Finite being has its limited
participation in the divine eternity. The problem with Kant is that the horizon
of time is the ego, while the problem with Heidegger is that only the future of
one’s own death constitutes meaning and time. Yet, meaning and wholeness occurs
in the context of eternity, of the possible completion and participation of
time in eternity.[17]
This creative force moves against the countervailing increase of entropy, which
amounts to the dissolution of creatures as they deteriorate and move toward
inert uniformity. This creative dynamic of the Spirit is entry into the
eternity of God. The goal of the dynamic of the Spirit is to give creaturely
forms duration by a share in eternity and to protect them against the tendency
to disintegrate. He wants to think of the dynamic of the divine Spirit as a
working field. It links to time by the power of the future that gives creatures
their present and duration. It links to space by the simultaneity of creatures in
their duration. The Spirit encounters the creature as its future, which
embraces its origin and its possible fulfillment. Moltmann (God in Creation, Chapter 4) will frame
this future as the arrival of Sabbath, where God once again declares the
goodness of creation and where God rests in the sense of taking pleasure in
restored fellowship with creation. As he sees it, then, the eternal divine life
is a life of
eternal, infinite love, which in the
creative process issues in its overflowing rapture from its Trinitarian
perfection and completeness, and comes to itself in the eternal rest of the
Sabbath. It is the same love, but it operates in different ways in the divine
life and in the divine creativity.[18]
In subsection (d), Pannenberg discusses the
creative working of the Spirit and the doctrine of angels. He will interact
with Barth in Church Dogmatics III.3
[51]. Naturalist assumptions seem largely to have undercut the possibility of
angels.[19]
Yet, he is willing to reformulate this teaching. He wants to see angels as a
force, such as “principalities and powers” in the New Testament. He refers to
revival of the doctrine of angels and demons represented by Paul Tillich and
the archetypes in depth psychology. For Pannenberg, the angels of the biblical
traditions are natural forces that from another angle might be the object of
scientific descriptions. Demons are the increase of entropy. Yet, for him, the
creative energy of the divine Spirit means that destructive powers are not the
only determinative ground of creaturely reality.
In subsection (e),
Pannenberg discusses the cooperation of Son and Spirit in the work of creation.
In fact, Moltmann (God in Creation,
Chapter 4) will put it stronger, saying that the specifically Christian
contribution to a notion of creation is that of the cosmic Christ and the work
of the Spirit. As he sees it, a Trinitarian view of creation leads us away from
both deism and pantheism and toward panentheism. The Creator Spirit suggests
that each individual is part of the whole. Everything finite is a
representative of the Infinite. The universe becomes an open system. Pannenberg
wants to bring together his discussion of Logos and Spirit. Logos, as it
represents natural laws, is the information system that allows for the
transition to new creaturely forms. The history of the earth has seen the
development of organized life and the continued higher structuring of its
forms. It becomes a chain of events. Theologians find in this story of the
continued higher structuring of forms an analogy to the history of divine
election. He refers to I Corinthians 1:27 to the effect that God chose what is
weak in the world to shame the strong. He finds here an analogy to evolution,
in which the improbable exception becomes the intimation of a new creation.
Thus, while entropy and its dissolution of creatures is a downward movement,
evolution is an upward movement. He thinks higher structuring in the sense of
increasing complexity is an open possibility with this framework, referring to
Bergson and Teilhard de Chardin. He refers to Peacocke, God and the New Biology and Creation
and the World of Science. The Logos is the means through which creation has
its order, while the working of the Spirit involves the emergence of new forms.
The Christian notion of Incarnation is the highest instance of creation.
In Section 3 of
Part II, Pannenberg discusses the sequence of forms. Creatures refer to each
other and relate to each other. They live off lower creatures, but they also
live for them. A theological doctrine of creation should follow where the
biblical witness leads by claiming current knowledge of the world shown in
science as a description of the work of God. Thus, theology will not do justice
to the biblical witness if it tries to preserve the time-bound ideas with which
the biblical account in Genesis 1 works.
He points to Isaac Asimov, In the
Beginning, as saying that Genesis 1 follows the modern order to creation to
an astonishing degree. Thus, the biblical account has light at the beginning,
humans at the end, light prior to the stars, plants springing from the earth,
the function of vegetation as a presupposition of animal life, and the close
relation between humans and land animals on the sixth day as opposed to sea
creatures on the fifth day. Doing justice to the biblical witness will mean
uniting its concern for an established order we see in Genesis 1 with the
constant bringing forth of things that are new that modern science describes.
He admits that the church was slow to recognize the opportunity that
evolutionary theory provided for the church and theology, doing great harm to
relations between church and science. Philosophically, the church overly
committed itself to a philosophy of constancy and to an over-estimation of
humanity. He refers to Lux Mundi that
Charles Gore edited as pioneering the way toward embracing the theory. He
refers to the creationist effort of Henry M. Morris and John C. Whitcome in The Genesis Flood as a negative in that it
rests primarily on a fundamentalist view of the authority of the texts. He
likes Teilhard de Chardin in this regard (Moltmann does as well), as well as
Karl Rahner and Ian Barbour. He again appeals to II Isaiah for the notion of
the creative nature of the acts of God in history. This notion becomes the
basis for the idea of emergent evolution. He admits that science today traces
back all forms of nature to elementary processes, a difference with the
biblical account. He is consistent with Moltmann (God in Creation, Chapter 1) here, who will also point to science
breaking down its study to the smallest particles to its smallest elements,
while the theologian will need to focus upon the complex way the finite things
of creation relate to each other. The point Pannenberg will want to stress is
that even such elements occur within a field of relation, the field becoming
the basis for enduring forms. The smallest elements are in relation to the
structural links that forms the totality of creation. Even subatomic particles
have a holistic character. The emergence of humanity out of such processes is
an example. The universe is an “end,” with the parts and the totality
conditioning each other. The expansion of the universe reveals the commitment
of God to continuing creative activity. In this context, the multiplicity of
living creatures in such abundance means competition with each other for the
use of the energy in their environment. Living forms have energy and have the
dignity of coming into existence for their own sakes, an important aspect of
their distinctive beauty. The self-organizing principle of living things
follows the pattern in the Bible of their fruitfulness. The sexual form of this
fruitfulness is the basis for the greater variety within a species. The
selection of sexual unions within a species opens up space within which life
can expand. In this process, life is a good and such creativity is
participation in the creativity and sustaining work of God. Of course, this sharing
also means a possible demonic perversion of the gift. The divine likeness and
the closeness to God it suggests gives humanity a special place in the creative
work of God. Yet, this special place does not necessarily mean humanity is the
goal of evolution. Evolution might lead to other forms of intelligent life.
Theology can take the step that the appearance of humanity brings fully to
light for the first time the meaning of all creaturely reality. The will of the
Creator is that the creature should be as an independent existence. Only humans
learned to see divine reality in its distinction from everything finite.
Therefore, he sees no problem with evolutionary theory. It does not rule out
our closeness to God. He will stress that creaturely independence is a gift of
God in creation. Yet, continued creaturely life depends upon fellowship with
the eternal God. The Incarnation of the Son reveals that creation comes to
fulfillment in us. The attainment of the goal is still ahead of us. It becomes
the object of eschatological hope.
In Part III,
Pannenberg will discuss creation and eschatology, taking a final look at the
constitution of the world as a whole in the light of its Creator. It fulfills
his promise that eschatology must be a theme of every part of Christian
doctrine, rather than an isolated theme at the end.
In Section 1 of
Part III, he will discuss the unity and distinction of the act of creation and
the eschaton. The goal of creation is to share in the life of God. Even the
sighing of creation (Romans 8:21-22) is an expression of the presence of the
life-giving Spirit. The fact that the goal is not yet reality is the theme of
eschatology. The fact that the destiny of creation is ahead of it means
creation and eschatology belong together. He is exploring the relation of
beginning and end in the action of God. His point is that the eschatological
future of God in the coming kingdom is the standpoint from which to understand
the world as a whole. This view will affect the beginning. The beginning loses its
function as an unalterably valid basis of unity in the whole process. Ulrich
Wilckens refers to Luke 12:22-31 as linking the everyday care of God and the
kingdom of God that is at hand. To surrender to God the cares of everyday and
to have an orientation to an attentive expectation of the impending rule of God
is the same thing. The nearness of the rule of God has an intimate connection
with creation, providence, and everyday life.[20]
In Section 2 of
Part III, Pannenberg will discuss the beginning and end of the universe.
Classical philosophy and the theology of the Middle Ages debated the question
of whether the world has no beginning. The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 made
obligatory the doctrine that the world had a temporal beginning. Modern science
has set aside the idea of an infinite universe due to its theory of relativity.
It teaches us to think of the world as spatially unlimited yet finite. This
meant that the universe as a spatial and temporal extension became a subject of
empirical research. It seems logical to assume that an expanding universe means
it had a temporal beginning. Pius XII on November 22, 1951 claimed as much.
Yet, while science can lead us to infinitely dense mass and infinitely
compressed space, it can only approximate the beginning of time. In its
computation, we do not have t=0. The
question seems unanswerable. Yet, we can reasonably assume that as a finite
process, the universe had a temporal beginning, which would mean the beginning
of time. Jewish apocalyptic wrote freely of the end of the world, but science
is not accustomed to do so. It can do so with the second law of thermodynamics,
a state of equilibrium, the death of heat. The anthropic principle, if true,
would mean the eventual intellectual dominion over the universe. This view
assumes that the emergence of intelligence has constitutive significance for
the process of the universe. This view would suggest that the omega point
allows us to think of eschatology as constitutive for the universe. He wants to
see such scientific considerations as overlapping with the theological concern
for eschatology. Moltmann (God in
Creation, Chapter 5) will stress that believers do not need to experience
the prison of the past in its sin, death, and Law, but rather, find their definition
from the future.
In Section 3, Part
III, Pannenberg discusses belief in creation and theodicy. Pannenberg thinks he
has shown that the biblical God could have created the world science describes.
He wants the modern person to keep open the possibility of speaking about God
in an intellectually responsible way. The claim that the reality of nature and
human history is the work of God is debatable. The self-organizing independence
of creatures leaves the impression that they need no divine Creator to explain
them. The senseless suffering we find in creation leaves doubt as to the
goodness of creation. In Genesis 1, the goodness of creation rests on being in
accord with the divine purpose in creation. Unbelief appeals to the fact of
evil in the world, recalling the innocent and disproportionate suffering of
creatures. Christian teaching has tried to protect God from the charge that God
directly causes evil.[21]
Yet, he points to Brothers Karamazov Book
5, Chapter 4 and Albert Camus The Plague 198ff
as expressing the depths of this suffering. The point is that the Biblical God
bears responsibility for the world God created. Christianity can meet the
objection only with an eschatology that hopes for resurrection. The
philosophical explanation of suffering and evil of one like Leibniz cries out
for the real overcoming of evil. Only God can give a satisfying answer. As long
as humanity looks only at the incomplete course of history the fact of evil remains
an insoluble riddle and offense to a wise, good, and almighty God. The question
remains open as to why the Creator did not create a world in which pain and
guilt did not exist. We can cast fictitious scenarios, but the exercise is
always unfulfilling.[22]
Our eyesight remains clouded.[23]
He refers to John Hick (Evil and the God
of Love and Death and Eternal Life)
as well as David Hume, Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion, Part 11. God apparently wanted free and
independent creatures that can spontaneously acknowledge the deity of God. If
they did so, they would correspond to the fellowship of the Father and Son.
However, the decision carried with it the risk of a misuse of this freedom.
Yet, this notion still lays responsibility for the presence of evil and suffering
on a decision made by God. The Creator accepts the risk of sin and evil as a
condition of realizing the goal of free fellowship of the creature with God.
Evil is an accompanying phenomena of this decision by God. Theological
tradition has described evil as ontologically invalid because it is not a work
of the divine will. Even if the sin of creatures is the immediate cause of
evil, God is still responsible. In fact, God accepted responsibility for evil
in the sending of the Son to the cross. The theological tradition points to the
ontological weakness of finite creatures, a point Leibniz makes. Limitation
constitutes being a creature. He refers to John Hick in Evil and the God of Love in this discussion. He also refers to
Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 34ff.
Yet, this notion is not enough, for humanity revolts against this limit in its
desire to be like God in Genesis 3:5. As Robert Jensen points out, the orthodox
position and the Bible unite in saying that the possibility of evil arises with
the actions of human beings.[24]
God granted independence, but humanity asserted autonomy, turning away from the
source of its life. Evil became possible simply through the limit of finitude.
However, asserting themselves against each other and the Creator is the root of
evil and suffering. The independence of creatures means the concealment of
deity in creation. He concludes, then, that belief in creation must go hand in
hand with the hope of eschatological victory over the reality of evil and sin.
Without this hope, one has no answer to the question of theodicy. Creation has
an intimate link with the reconciling and redeeming of the world. Therefore,
the Creator is our ally in the battle to overcome evil and to reduce and heal
suffering in the world. Praise of God as Creator is always in anticipation of
the eschatological consummation. Finite reality praises God in its continuation
and in its perishing. Eschatological consummation of the world is the only way
to demonstrate the righteousness and deity of the biblical God.
[1] (Oden 1987) , 127.
[2] (Hodgson 1994) , Chapters 12 and 13.
[3] (Jenson 1997) , Volume II, 10-11,
referring to First Principles, 9.13-14
and Dogmatik 1870, 1.135.
[4] (Oden 1987) , 134.
[5] (Pannenberg, Jesus -- God and Man 1964, 1968) , p. 390-7.
[6] (Jenson 1997) , Volume II, 25.
[7] (Systematic Theology,1951, Volume 2,
p. 252ff)
[8] (Systematic Theology, Vol. One, 1951,
p. 261-263)
[9] (Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective
1985) ,
522-32.
[10] (Systematic Theology, Vol. One, 1951,
p. 263ff)
[11] (Oden 1987) , 143.
[12] (Jenson 1997) , Volume II, 19.
[13] (Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science
1973, 1976) ,
64-71.
[14] (Pannenberg, Metaphysics and the Idea of God 1988,
1990) ,
p. 113-29.
[15] (Jenson 1997) , Volume II 29.
[16] (Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God 1969) , 67-68.
[17] (Pannenberg, Metaphysics and the Idea of God 1988,
1990) ,
69-90.
[18] (Moltmann, God in Creation 1985) , 84.
[19] (Oden 1987) , 132.
[20] (Pannenberg, Revelation as History 1961, 1968) , p. 117, note 35.
[21] (Oden 1987) , 150.
[22] (Jenson 1997) , 23.
[23] (Oden 1987) , 140.
[24] (Jenson 1997) , Volume II, 21.
Superb summary. In preparation for reading WP's Systematic Theology I have begun reading Stanley Grenz' Reason for Hope. I can't wait to be done with it so I can start reading WP himself.
ReplyDeleteThanks for all the work you put into your posts.
Thank you for reading and commenting. Please feel free to read WP and my summary and make any observations you wish, of course, but especially from what you have read in Moltmann. Any references to points of similarity and difference would be helpful.
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