Tuesday, August 30, 2016

Dr. Congdon and Bultmann: The Strangeness of the Gospel and Demythologizing


¶ 3


Third, Dr. Congdon has made me more aware of the alien or strange nature of the gospel. An important reason for this strangeness is the context that Jewish apocalyptic provides for understanding both Jesus and the apostolic witness contained in the gospel. Jewish apocalyptic will feel strange and alien to the person living in the technocratic, scientific, and democratic setting of today. Demythologizing as Bultmann practices it is way of addressing the nature of this strangeness. Although the theologian may disagree with the direction Bultmann takes the mission of demythologizing, it seems inescapable that the theologian, and therefore the preacher and teacher in the church, will engage in the mission of demythologizing in some form. In effect, I hope I can raise the question for the reader not so much of whether the reader demythologizes, but how and on what basis you demythologize.

In the form of a reminder, Bultmann gained much scholarly attention for his work on myth and demythology. If people know Bultmann today, they will associate him with the program of demythologizing. The focus of my attention in this reflection is the continuing relevance of Jewish apocalyptic. We find Jewish apocalyptic as part of the background of the preaching of Jesus and the formation of New Testament proclamation and teaching. We can see this background most importantly in the witness by the apostles to the resurrection of Jesus. Therefore, we are dealing with the demythologizing of the heart of the Christian proclamation. The question I am exploring is whether this project is legitimate and if so, the form it ought to take.

Given that we are reflecting upon Jewish apocalyptic, an interesting aspect of the matter before us is the continuing significance of Israel for Christian proclamation. In order to introduce this issue, Bultmann viewed Jewish history as the history of the shipwreck of the law. They felt the call of God but remained imprisoned in secular history. Its history becomes an example of the shipwreck of human existence under the law in general. Bultmann has rightly understood that the argument of Paul concerning the Law assumes the general experience of humanity under law. Yet, Paul focused his understanding of salvation by grace and through faith “apart from” Jewish Law. For Bultmann, then, Judaism becomes a negative foil to the gospel and a Christian notion of existence. Israel receives a demotion, becoming like all nations. Its history becomes a matter of indifference. The entire notion of its election and calling is part of its myth that deserves demythologizing. For Bultmann, Christian faith has no interest in world history. The sole interest of Christian proclamation for Bultmann is in the justification of the sinner. The student of the New Testament and particularly of Paul in Romans should recognize a problem with the position of Bultmann. Regardless of his fidelity to his Lutheran emphasis upon justification, he fails to acknowledge the continuing significance of Israel in Paul, especially in his exposition in Romans 9-11. We can agree that the gospel is the “end of the law,” but at the same time fulfillment of the promise received from Israel.[1] For many of us, such a theological connection with Israel and Judaism is an important protection as the church deals with its history of anti-Semitism. If Christianity faces honestly the way Judaism forms Christian proclamation, it may develop a love and appreciation for the Jewish people and Israel. Jews and Christians are in some way united in being the people of God in the world, witnessing to the action of the God of Israel for the reconciliation and redemption (salvation) of the world.

Another introductory matter is an understanding of myth. Stated simply, myth is any sequential narrative about a deity. Thus, demythologizing is identifying the impact of such a narrative in such a fashion as to overcome the narrative. In Bultmann, this means that the Old Testament becomes an antithetic background for the New Testament. In his Theology of the New Testament Bultmann famously wrote that the preaching of Jesus is the presupposition of New Testament theology, but not a part of it. As the history of Israel is a matter of indifference to Christian proclamation, so is the history of Jesus of Nazareth. This view justifies the infamous placement by Bultmann of the preaching of Jesus in the tradition of Jewish faith rather than part of Christian proclamation. The narration of Jesus in his Jewish context is a presupposition because it shows how Jesus was an historical figure. The Jesus of history becomes the background of the eschatological event. Yet, proclamation will have to overcome its mythic narration in order to become the eschatological moment relevant for every time and place.

I want to sharpen the issue further. Such reflections lead to important conclusions about Jesus and the early preaching of the church. Bultmann will identify Jewish apocalyptic as the primary context of the original kerygma/gospel/proclamation of the early church. The preaching of Jesus was eschatological in its focus on imminent the rule of God. He speaks and acts with respect to the coming rule of God. He looks forward to the eschaton. The fact that Jesus is the one who preaches this way is its historical uniqueness. His preaching reduces to contemporary Judaism. Its content is prophetic or radicalized Torah. The novelty is that he announces the coming rule of God on the way to the cross. His “hour” is the last hour. His preaching is decisive, but the content of his preaching is not. Jesus identified himself in his preaching. His preaching is promise. The person of Jesus merges into his words. His Word is event. The scandal is that his physical death ends the eschatological message of Jesus concerning the imminent rule of God. To put it bluntly, the content of his teaching must die with him. What the historian will need to explain, however, is that the proclaimer becomes the proclaimed. Bultmann will heighten our sense of this gap. He explains the preaching of Paul by saying that for Paul, the eschaton that for Jesus was future has become past in the resurrection. His eschatological preaching focused on the righteousness of God already revealed in the cross and resurrection of Jesus. The coming rule of God has already begun.[2]

Such reflections by Bultmann lead him to an important reconsideration of the Jewish apocalyptic notion of resurrection. The traditional notion of resurrection, for example, whether referring to God raising Jesus from the dead or to the general resurrection of the dead at the end of this age, are part of an apocalyptic picture of the world that has become strange and obsolete to us who live in a scientific, democratic, technological age. To continue expecting people to believe this kerygma makes the kerygma oppressive rather than liberating. Bultmann does not want to bind faith to antiquated/alien cosmologies. His program of demythologizing is a missionary attempt to make faith in Christ a liberating possibility in another time and place, where Jewish apocalyptic is strange and obsolete.[3]

The point of demythologizing in Bultmann, then, is to bring the strangeness of the gospel into the arena of the grace of God encountering the human being as a sinner, to which the sinner can respond only with faith and obedience. This leads him to emphasize the new self-understanding that comes with the encounter with grace. Bultmann will focus upon personal encounter, subjective experience, or the existential decision, to which the Easter kerygma leads. This explains why Easter, for him, is not a matter of narrating what God has done in Jesus Christ. Rather, the significance of Easter is the rise of faith in the hearts and lives of the disciples. This faith means the rise of a new self-understanding they had of themselves as sinners who encounter grace from God in Jesus Christ. Now, to be clear, few of us would question such an explanation of the subjective experience of the disciples. The transformation of the disciples is one of the great stories of the New Testament. The question is whether demythologizing the basis or reason for this shift in perspective is legitimate.

Thus, let us consider how another theologian might interpret the theological task of demythologizing differently. One obvious direction to go is to focus upon the historical reality of the witness of the New Testament concerning the resurrection of Jesus. Moltmann, for example, will remind us that the accounts of Easter in the gospels and Paul do not have the intent of simply providing a new self-understanding of faith. Rather, a natural reading of the accounts compels us to ask about the reality of the event of which they tell. For Bultmann, one can grasp the resurrection of Jesus only in revelation. The result is that he remains unconcerned with the historical reality of the resurrection and focuses instead upon how the narrative of Easter concerns our existence. Bultmann assumes that the meaning of text is its existential truth rather than factual truth. The issue Bultmann sees in Easter is the understanding of human existence that finds expression in the narratives. Easter is not about the event, but the Easter faith of the first disciples. Moltmann responds by saying that Bultmann seems to make the resurrection of Jesus hang in the air. The theologian will have to decide whether the texts, read in the context of the question of that in which we may hope, have significance for the future. As Moltmann sees it, meaning stretches towards that which it seeks to indicate. Applied to Easter, we know the historical character of Easter only in light of the future to which it points. We can then see their meaning for our future. Christ rose into the yet undetermined future realm ahead of us. The kerygma points us to this future, and thus, does not need demythologizing in the sense of setting aside the Christian hope of redemption of our history. Kerygma points to the future of Jesus Christ, not just the authenticity of our existence.[4]

The considerations offered by Moltmann remind us of the unique role eschatology played in the early dialectical theology movement, of which both Bultmann and Barth played important roles. Bultmann remains faithful to the early dialectical theology movement and its interpretation of time and eternity. It understood eschatology as the mutual negation of time and eternity. In its existentialist mutation, eternity is the timelessness of the moment of decision, located on a timeline but not extended on it. Eternity is the eschatological. The historical is the temporal. If the historical event is eschatological, it must reduce its historical reality to a sheer moment. Such a moment has no temporal extension and therefore no narration. However, as understandable as the concern is for bringing Christian proclamation to hearers today, Pannenberg points out that this attempt to take primitive Christian eschatology out of time or history has not proved in keeping with the New Testament view of eschatology and time or history.[5]

            The best example in Barth of early dialectical theology is when he said in his commentary on Romans that his dialectical theology consisted in the Kierkegaard principle of the infinite qualitative difference between time and eternity. The dialectic of time and eternity powered the critique of religion by Barth. He overcame the abstractness of the dialectic by transposing it into Christology. Time and eternity touch without overlap as the event of this one creature’s conflicted existence. The suffering of Christ undoes the pretensions of religion. As the death and resurrection of Christ enacts this difference, it constitutes the identification of God with us. In his context, and to be fair to Barth, Barth was able to expound in a fresh way the eschatological message of the lordship of God that concerned his contemporaries. He related this lordship to the human world. He also related this lordship to judgment. The readiness to accept this view occurred in the context of the disaster of WWI, in which European culture of the previous century collapsed. He also adopted the new sensitivity to the meaning of the frontier of death through Franz Overbeck and Heidegger. Barth recovered the relevance of the eschatological mood of primitive Christianity. However, Barth did little to develop the specific theological theme of eschatology. Toward the end of his life, in letters to Pannenberg and Moltmann, we receive an insight into the reason. He did not want eschatology to become the center of theological exposition. He saw a danger in such a theological move that he was not able to overcome in his mind. He also did little to develop the influence of this theme upon the final future of humanity and the world. Barth seems to join Bultmann in focusing his eschatology on the tension between time and eternity. He made the temporal future to which biblical eschatology point irrelevant. In Bultmann, such hopes for a temporal future become metaphors and myths for an existential interpretation of authentic living. Barth saw the danger of this approach as well. Thus, the eschatology of the commentary of Barth on Romans gave way to his Christological focus in Church Dogmatics II.1 and IV. What Barth accomplished was immense. He prepared the way for the next generation of scholars to reflect upon the nature of the future rule of God. Authors like Walter Krek, J├╝rgen Moltmann, and Gerhard Sauter, along with Pannenberg have picked up the task. Such authors criticize Barth and Bultmann for taking eschatology out of time through their dialectical theology. They want to restore the future sense of biblical eschatology to theological thinking. They do so with the concept that Christ is the promise of this future.[6]  

Let us consider eschatology from another perspective. As we have just discussed, the focus of Bultmann is on Christ as present in the kerygma/gospel/the preached word. Thus, in a sense, our faith today has its basis in something outside us. However, the “something” is the kerygma, which is a product of the faith of the early church. Faith remains ex-centric in that it remains an encounter with and an obedient response to God. God confronts us in Jesus Christ, thereby providing us with the possibility of a new self-understanding. Faith that focuses on itself is not faith, as love that focuses on itself is not love.[7]

Therefore, Christology in Bultmann has more to do with examining the Jesus present today in the preached word. Bultmann will want to separate the kerygma from history. He is willing to separate the historical reality of Jesus from the faith we have today in the eschatological event of Jesus as it confronts us in the preached word. Yet, in a concession to the role of history, Bultmann will admit that the call to decision contained in the preaching of Jesus carries with it an implied Christology. Such a statement became the basis for the new quest for the historical Jesus that we find in his students. His students remind us that the kerygma itself forces hearers to consider its reference to history. However, the interest of Bultmann in Jesus of Nazareth as he relates to the faith we have today in Christ is minimal. The point Bultmann makes here is that eschatology swallows up history. Given the context in which he wrote he is far superior in this matter to Albert Schweitzer and others of the consistent eschatology school of thought. For Schweitzer, the disappointment of the imminent expectation for the rule of God in Jesus and the early church found its replacement in cult, morality, and metaphysics. However, Bultmann divested the eschatological message of Jesus from any temporal reference. He did this to establish the validity of the formal attitude of openness for the future in general, thereby saving faith in Christ for a modern understanding of the world. We can see the missionary emphasis of the program of demythologizing at this point. In order to do this, he brings the apocalyptic movement in Judaism into sharp contrast with history. As eschatology swallows up history, he thinks he has come upon the real meaning of the eschatological element in the message of Jesus. He cuts it free from all reference to history, even if some elements of history remain in it. To put it another way, he refuses to confine faithful God-talk to metaphysical modes of thinking or a worldview foreign to the primitive setting of the kerygma.[8] History is eschatological in the sense that any event is historical in terms of its relation to the future, in which it shows itself what it is.[9]

From this perspective, we must note again that Bultmann is still cutting off the kerygma from a temporal future toward which the coming rule of God points and therefore cutting it off from the very hope that gave it its power in the apostolic age. The life and preaching of Jesus would not have arisen without this temporal hope for the transformation of humanity and this world. Cutting off eschatology from temporality and replacing it with the attitude of unworldly openness in the framework of a noneschatological understanding of the world would mean the message would not endure. Not only that, such an understanding becomes something other than the conduct to which Jesus calls his hearers. To grant an important point to Bultmann, the imminent expectation of the rule of God that determined the activity and life of Jesus is no longer a live option for us and is unnecessary. Could we suggest that the New Testament does its own form of demythologizing? In the New Testament, the imminent expectation had its fulfillment in the resurrection of Jesus. This fact liberates those who believe today from thinking of when the end will come. Therefore, the theologian might say that we can live and think in continuity with apostolic Christianity and thus with the activity of Jesus if we recognize its proleptic fulfillment in the resurrection of Jesus. We can retain the expectation and hope for its universal consequence. Historically, early Christianity seemed to move from one enthusiastic certainty of fulfillment followed by another. Thus, we do not see the New Testament relate it to a particular calendar date. The passage of time does not make its hope outdated. What has appeared in the resurrection of Jesus still lies in the future for those bound to him in faith. Christians can continue to pray for the coming of the rule of God. Yet, to dismiss this expectation is to make the message and fate of Jesus incomprehensible. True, Jesus could have delivered his message of the immanent coming of the rule of God only in his time and place. Yet, the message remains valid for all time by confronting humanity with questions of the ultimate destiny of humanity. The Bultmann restriction of the message to a new existentialist self-understanding seems to move against the kerygma itself. The particularity of the activity of Jesus, who delivered a message for his time, places us all before the ultimate decision in the presence of the God who is coming, just as God came in the earthly ministry of Jesus. For that reason, Christians can confidently proclaim the universal validity of the life and fate of Jesus.[10]

The issues raised here are critical for the theologian. They are every bit as critical for the preacher and teacher in the church. One can see why both Bultmann and Barth had concerns about an emphasis upon the redemption of our experienced time in an act of God that ends our experience of time. For many of us, schooled in philosophy and science, this hope or expectation is simply not plausible. If belief in Jesus and involvement in the church mean acceptance of an implausible hope, then we might be better off to dismiss this apostolic hope as unnecessary. Both theologians, in quite different ways, have demythologized eschatology. Bultmann did so with focusing primarily upon the human act of faith. To be clear, Bultmann loosens the tie with history in order to give contemporaries the opportunity to fill with new content what it means to live out of the act of faith. Barth demythologized with his massive reflection on Christology in Volume IV, by which he sought to give historical content to the act of faith in pointing us to the Christ of the gospels. Either approach would appear to be the easier path for the theologian in terms of addressing the issues modern people may have. In neither case do we find simply a form of pandering to the modern consciousness. Both are willing to push back at many points. Both remove a significant impediment to belief. Yet, the caution here is that both tend to focus upon the individual.

The two most important “post-Barthian” theologians, Moltmann and Pannenberg, chose to go the direction of making eschatology an organizing principle of their theology. Moltmann said that at European theological seminars, he and Pannenberg received the label, “the hope boys” in the 1960s. They went the direction Barth advised them not to go. Both wrestle with the implausibility of eschatology if we relate it to the redemption of our time. Science, philosophy, and history speak powerfully against this aspect of early Christian thinking. Moltmann pushes back in saying that a cosmic eschatology allows one to assert the eschatological existence of humanity. As such, the attempt to reconcile eschatology with a modern or Kantian notion of science and reality will fail.[11] He reminds us that the early church would have no reason or right to proclaim its message if it were not for ideas of cosmological apocalyptic.[12] Moltmann and Pannenberg placed hope or eschatology in the sense of redemption of our historical time at the center of their respective theological reflections. This leads to some important theological reflections that we do not find in Bultmann and receive little attention in Barth. The hope of redemption is communal. They focus upon the redemption of creation and humanity. I would summarize Pannenberg as saying that he is able to live with the victory of Jesus Christ accomplished in the resurrection. The defeat of evil powers and the redemption of humanity and creation began at that moment. The hope of the church for its redemption, and along with it the redemption of creation and humanity, places us between the already of the resurrection of Jesus and the not yet of the redemption of all things. This tension creates a narrative of the eschatological action of God in Christ. This action of God in Christ is an anticipation of the end. This action opens the possibility of a people of God from all nations and a new eschatological life for individuals. In the process, the resurrection of Jesus provides a reliable and trustworthy basis for this hope. It also provides a reliable basis, if not proof, for the act of faith in Christ and in the hope of redemption.

To conclude and affirming it again, the issues for the theologian, the church, and the preacher, are immense. No matter how you demythologize, you will not remove the strangeness of the gospel. Bultmann must deal with the strangeness of his notion of the Christ-centered nature of authentic living. Barth must deal with the strangeness of his Christ-centered answer to human imprisonment in sin. Moltmann and Pannenberg must deal with the strangeness of the resurrection of Jesus and its hope for a redeemed creation and humanity.  

Bultmann tends to focus upon the past as a prison from which one needs liberation. The attractiveness of this approach is that the history of the church is full of teaching and practice from which the church needed liberation. The church has made mistakes that became orthodoxy or orthopraxis. Yet, adopting this approach means that the object of the act of faith can become a matter of filling “Jesus Christ” with any content one chooses. The danger here is that some attractive ideology or worldview becomes our idol, with Christ put into service of that idol. The use Bultmann makes of Heidegger raises this question. The desire of many theologians today to make their theology politically relevant is open to the same danger. Most significantly, the subject of the present act of faith that Bultmann describes as “eschatological life” becomes any kind of life we say it is. Of course, such a life must be “authentic” and “loving,” while the content of such a life remains ambiguous.

In contrast, the theologian may suggest that the past is not something I secure by my decision. Rather, I have acknowledged the free act of God in Jesus Christ as a self-revelation of the God who loves us and is gracious toward us as sinners. I surrender other things in which I might trust in order to trust in this action of God. Yes, the past might be a prison. The church imprisons people if it surrenders to legalism or turning a moment of the past into an idol. Yet, the past can also be the vehicle of a new life of freedom as a child of God. This approach keeps the church today connected with the early church. The church today is still the church of Jesus Christ and therefore an apostolic church. This connection is far from a prison. In fact, having properly acknowledged the past action of God in Jesus Christ and in the apostolic witness to that action, we are now free for the future defined by the coming God and life in the Spirit, recognizing that all my actions and decisions are provisional in light of a future defined by Jesus Christ. Defining this connection to the past action of God as proclaimed in the kerygma gives content to the act of faith, as it centers upon a life of participation in Christ and the scriptural witness to that revelation. Such participation in the risen Christ will internalize the meaning of baptism and the Lord’s Supper as saying to the world that we our lives are primarily about Christ and the Body of Christ. In addition, and in the spirit of wanting to conserve what is liberating in the apostolic witness, here is how I would give further content to this loving and authentic, but also apostolic, life. Participation in the risen Christ will also lead to a life of the love of God and neighbor (Jesus), a life of faith, hope, and love (Paul), a life of nourishing virtue and setting aside vice (Paul), a life of spiritually gifted ministry (Paul) and a life that transforms everyday life (household rules of Paul and Peter).




[1] (Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit: A Conribution to Messianic Ecclesiology 1975, 1977), 140-1.
[2] (Moltmann, The Crucified God 1973, 1974), 117-125; (Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit: A Conribution to Messianic Ecclesiology 1975, 1977), 81.
[3] (Congdon, The Mission of Demythologizing, Kindle edition, 12611-12880).
[4] (Moltmann, Theology of Hope 1965, 1967), 173, 178, 185-7, 189-90, 212-3.
[5] (Pannenberg, Systematic Theology 1998, 1991), Volume I, 249.
[6] (Pannenberg, Systematic Theology 1998, 1991), Volume 3, 537-8.
[7] Congdon, The Mission of Demythologizing, Kindle edition, 10495.
[8] Congdon, The Mission of Demythologizing, Kindle edition, 12155.
[9] Congdon, The Mission of Demythologizing, Kindle edition, 14865.
[10] Pannenberg, Jesus God and Man, 241-4; (Moltmann, The Crucified God 1973, 1974), 101.
[11] (Moltmann, Theology of Hope 1965, 1967), 69.
[12] (Moltmann, Theology of Hope 1965, 1967), 218.

Friday, August 26, 2016

David Congdon, Revelation, Salvation and Making Connections


¶ 2


Second, I would like to offer a way of clarifying the relation between the revelation of God on the one hand to other phenomenological descriptions of humanity, culture, and nature on the other. Bultmann opens this door with his use of the existential nature of human existence. The point here is to clarify revelation as our primary source for knowledge of God, but our knowledge of humanity and world might serve as an important point of contact for theology, preaching, and witness in the world.

The debate between Bultmann and Barth, as Dr. Congdon describes it, has made one thing increasingly clear. If we are to know anything about God, it will be because God reveals who God is. The initiative is from God. Revelation is therefore an expression of the grace and love of God for humanity. We hear revelation as a strange or foreign presence. In part, such strangeness arises out of differing cultural and intellectual settings. Yet, its strangeness also arises out of its eschatological and therefore divine nature. Its strangeness is a sign of human sin. Therefore, the revelation of God is manifestation of divine love and grace. God revealed who God is in Jesus Christ, especially in his cross and resurrection.

In considering the revelation of God, the cross is central to Bultmann. He says the cross is a permanent historical fact. As an historical act, crucifixion was a political act by the Roman Empire against rebels to their rule. However, Bultmann thinks his death as a political criminal was an accident of misunderstanding by Roman authorities. Historically speaking, his death was accidental and meaningless. To bring another theologian into the conversation, Moltmann disagrees with this assessment because that age united politics with religion. He thinks Pilate assessed the situation well, given the refusal of early Christianity to engage in emperor worship and willingness to experience martyrdom.[1] Moltmann says that historically, Bultmann is quite correct that we do not know whether Jesus found meaning in his death and if he did how he arrived at that meaning. He may have simply suffered a collapse. However, he wants it clear that Jesus died with the experience of God forsaking and abandoning him. Jesus clearly did not have the fine or beautiful death praised in Socrates or in the Stoic philosophy.[2]

The abiding and saving significance of the cross is that it reveals the judgment and deliverance of humanity. Preaching the cross is the event of redemption that challenges all who hear to appropriate this significance for themselves. We experience crucifixion with Christ through this turn to the cross in faith. Thus, Bultmann resists turning the cross into a myth. He also resists making it a meaningless historical event by stressing the role of faith. Authentic existence today depends upon this turn in faith to the cross. Yet, in criticism, it would appear that Bultmann deprives the cross of any significance of its own. It has significance only in the existential process of crucifixion with Christ, whereas this should be secondary. Bultmann wants to translate the cross into an eschatological history that originates in the historical event of the cross and continues in the life of the believer. If the crucifixion of Jesus is primary, then our crucifixion with Christ derives its significance from the death of Christ “for us.” The revelation of God in the cross, the one crucified for the godless, makes it possible for us to follow him. The danger in Bultmann is the cross becomes an example for the Christian to follow.[3]

Salvation of humanity is possible because of the eschatological nature of the revelation of God. One of the questions Bultmann as theologian raises is whether studies of the phenomena of the human can help the theologian explain the nature of this salvation and revelation. For Bultmann, this revelation reveals the future. Bultmann will provide an historical point of reference by focusing upon the eschatological preaching of Jesus as opening the door to understanding Jesus himself as the eschatological action of God. (In this approach, Pannenberg has learned much from Bultmann.) More importantly, Bultmann will rely upon the existential analysis of human existence to understand the nature of the turn to Christ by those who have faith. He can say that the revelation of God is a matter of human beings coming to themselves and understanding themselves truly. Arriving at our authentic self is salvation. Thus, revelation is the basis of authenticity. One cannot achieve authenticity through individual effort. Divinity discloses itself in authenticity. Revelation addresses us. Preaching is revelation. Faith discloses the object of faith. Faith belongs to revelation. Revelation has no content. Rather, it means individuals come to a new awareness of themselves. Revelation is the arrival of the eschaton.[4] In this way, his devotion to the existentialist analysis of human existence becomes a way to bring the revelation of God into contact with humanity as understood in a particular way. I should also stress, with the help of the study of Dr. Congdon, that Bultmann never lost the Christ-centered nature of this salvation and revelation. We will discuss this in another section.

I happen to think that this use of Heidegger by Bultmann the theologian is reasonable. In fact, his approach raises the question of other human reflections on the phenomena of the human relate to the theological attempt to understand and proclaim the revelatory act of God in Christ.

I suggest that Pannenberg can assist us in this question. He will also engage Heidegger, for example, but in a quite different way than does Bultmann. In fact, as I have kept reading Pannenberg over the decades, I have come to appreciate the nuance he brings to the table. Neither philosophy nor science can demonstrate anything like the existence or character of God. Orienting ourselves to this eschatological action of God will always be a matter of faith. However, he wants to probe human existence, most thoroughly in Anthropology from a Theological Perspective. He also wants to probe nature, mostly in his Systematic Theology and in several essays. He will do all of this from a phenomenological perspective because our capacity to even hear the "foreign" and "strange" word from God relies upon some kind of capacity (we might call this creation in the image of God or prevenient grace) that allows us to hear it as revelation. Human openness to the world becomes a "hint" of the divine orientation of humanity. He sees this in the religious orientation of humanity, which is for him constitutive of human existence. In this, Pannenberg and Bultmann intersect. Faith is openness to the future. Both see anthropology making an important contribution at this point. Bultmann will not broaden this conversation with philosophy into other areas. Pannenberg will do so. Thus, he wrestles with biology and physics because for him, the systematic theologian has the responsibility of showing that God could have created the world science describes. Again, this is not proof. He engages science because he wants to show that it does not make theological talk irrational. He is also willing to use science as an analogy for certain theological truths. Christ as the Word, for example, has an analogy in the information systems of biology and physics. The Spirit is life-giving and pervasive in the way that field theory describes energy. For him, he is following the same theological method as John in the use of the philosophical term Logos. I like the designation of this approach as a "reserved apologetic,” as a friend shared with me. I do not know if Pannenberg would agree with the term, but I like it because I think it accurately describes what Pannenberg is doing.

The theologian may well conclude that Heidegger is deficient in his analysis of human existence. What will be the different point of contact such a theologian will attempt to establish? The theologian may want to engage critically such an approach to human existence in a way we do not find in Bultmann. Such a critical engagement with a variety of the human sciences shows the ad hoc character of such connections for theology in a clearer way than the approach of Bultmann.

To conclude, I have high regard for Karl Barth. This regard does not blind me from seeing his deficiency here. Barth rightly saw the danger of a full-blown natural theology that would bring one far from the revelation of God. He wrongly believed Bultmann fell into this error. The devotion of Bultmann to his studies of the New Testament ought to suggest to us, if not to Barth, that Bultmann remained committed to understanding this revelation. Thus, I think Barth became so alert to the danger that any intentional and positive use of studies of the phenomena of the human in theology he tended to dismiss. I think he makes a category mistake here. The reality, I think, is that Barth himself uses philosophy, especially Kierkegaard, Sartre, Buber, and Heidegger, in a powerful and critically engaging way in Church Dogmatics III.2. He actually provides a good example of how a theologian can utilize the best efforts of studies of the phenomena of the human to provide a point of contact with culture today.

 



[1] (Moltmann, The Crucified God 1973, 1974), 136-45.
[2] (Moltmann, The Crucified God 1973, 1974), 145-53.
[3] (Moltmann, The Crucified God 1973, 1974), 61-2.
[4] (Moltmann, Theology of Hope 1965, 1967), 65-6.

Thursday, August 25, 2016

David Congdon and Use of Heidegger in Bultmann, Barth, Pannenberg


¶ 1


First, I would like to consider the important role of existentialism as theology considers the nature of humanity. The issue in the Barth-Bultmann debate is whether Barth was right in saying that the role of existentialism in Bultmann is similar to that of a full-blown natural theology. His concern is that such an approach so heightens the thoughts and observations of human beings that it devalues our reliance upon revelation for knowledge of God. Congdon will say that Barth is quite wrong, and I would tend to agree. This debate has led me to re-visit existentialism. As important as philosophy has been to the history of theology, theology needs to be sure its engagement is a critical one. I will explore the way Bultmann, Barth, and Pannenberg make use of Heidegger and see what we can learn of a proper theological use of a philosophical perspective.

The tie that Bultmann developed with existentialism was the reason Pannenberg thought Bultmann eclipsed Barth in the theological world, at least in the 70s and 80s. Barth would likely concur, since in the early 60s he thought the academic world of theology had already set him aside. The place of existentialism is far more obvious in Bultmann than we find it in Barth. In CD III.2, Barth will be in a subtle conversation-debate with existentialism. On an anecdotal level, I must say that even in conservative Christian schools I attended, reading Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, and Camus was important, even if to argue against, in some cases, was the primary purpose. Congdon suggests that Bultmann had a far more modest approach to his use of existentialism than Barth thought. Bultmann would agree with Barth that a philosophical perspective should not become a worldview. I will show that we have some different approaches to Heidegger in these theologians.

Bultmann was a faithful pupil of Wilhelm Herrmann. One of the things Bultmann learned from him is the exclusive relation to existence or self of all statements about God and divine action. Hermann could say that the object of theology is God, but that theology discusses its object by speaking of the God who confronts human beings in the light of faith. Faith becomes a matter of comprehending our existence, which is at the same time comprehending God. If we speak of God, then we must speak of ourselves. This amounts to saying that statements about God and divine action bear on human existence. This means the rejection of objective statements about God that do not bear directly upon human existence. Such objective statements about God that do not bear upon existence are the realm of myth and world-picture. This connection to Herrmann is one that Barth noted. He described it as the ethical and anthropological form that Bultmann gives to the message and faith of Christianity. Bultmann also derives from Herrmann his holy respect for the secular rules for the world and science.[1]

In a limited way, Bultmann sought a point of contact between theology and nontheological anthropological studies. Heidegger was that point of contact. To view the matter from the perspective of Barth for a moment, Barth refers to Heidegger as developing a modern ontology instructed by Kierkegaard. It interprets human existence historically, projecting itself toward nothingness. He thinks that Bultmann sought to understand human existence prior to faith along the lines of Heidegger. Bultmann shares the methodology of Schleiermacher, which means the analysis of human existence provides the framework of a general view of humanity.[2] Barth will stress that modernity is not the measure of all things, even while it appears indispensable. Existentialism will have a successor. The time of the dominance of Hegel had more justification for the place it gave Hegel than do persons today have for giving existentialism such a dominant role. He thinks theology needs to be more far-sighted and reject any attempt to co-ordinate with this temporarily predominant philosophical trend of existentialism. Yet, on the positive side, Barth admits that we need to consider and learn from the typical philosophical thinking of the day.[3] For Bultmann, one can elaborate existentially the subject matter of theology only in the form of anthropology. He sees the point of contact as resolving the opposition of revelation to the human being as sinner. However, he viewed revelation as a judgment on the negation of the human. Thus, he did not achieve a critical appropriation of an anthropology based on existential philosophy. Yet, he regarded this anthropology as normative. He accepted as valid the pretheological interpretation of the person given in the analysis of human existence by Heidegger, but without any critical discussion of the individual claims made in that analysis. He offered a global negative evaluation of it as a description of the understanding of human existence by the sinner and used it in this form as a negative foil for theology.[4] My hope is that the discussion will show how a theologian might engage in a critical discussion of existentialist analysis.

Let us consider human brokenness under the theme of the theological understanding of original sin. Barth will argue that the empirical psychological data had no connection with Christian theological statements about human sinfulness. When we know Jesus Christ, we know the sinfulness of humanity.[5] Yet, this would mean that those who do not believe would have no realization of the brokenness that characterizes human existence. At the same time, it seems self-evident that those who have no faith must still face the confrontation between their human destiny on the one hand and the structure of their behavior on the other. Thus, one can legitimately make a point of contact between theology and philosophy as the philosopher might disclose dimensions of human brokenness. Heidegger could certainly have insight into the nature of that brokenness. Of course, Barth is partially correct, for the knowledge of God makes it possible for us to see the perversity of the behavior of sin arising from a turn from God. Such knowledge arises from a turning in faith to the self-revelation of God.[6]

If we turn to Pannenberg, we see a theologian who is going to be willing to re-think the notion of original sin in light of the exploration into human existence we find in existentialism in general and Heidegger in particular. He will focus upon the insight that anxiety or dread is primary as we consider the structure of human existence. Thus, Kierkegaard is largely correct. He came close to dissolving the transcendental concept of the subject of idealistic philosophy. The subject is in a state of becoming with regard to its selfhood and therefore its freedom. Dread for him has no definite object, other than the one experiencing dread as a concern for the unity of the self. Dread particularly experiences the loss of connection with the Infinite, and thus grasp at finite things to bring wholeness. As the synthesis of the Infinite and the finite, he is describing the same thing that many thinkers describe as self-transcendence, openness to the world, and exo-centricity. As finite beings, humanity reaches beyond finitude and toward the Infinite and Eternal. This reaching out would not be possible if human beings were simply finite. Theologically, we can think of the brokenness of the synthesis as a reflection of the dignity of humanity as made in the image of God and the misery of humanity in its sinfulness. Heidegger will take the phenomenon of dread or anxiety as a paradigm for the basic structure of human existence in the world. He will remove anxiety from a tension between the Infinite and Eternal as seen in Kierkegaard and locate it fully in the experience of individuals in this world. Care with regard to self determines the structure of human existence. Self-love becomes the focus of human existence. As care for self dominates us, our lives no longer have a life characterized by trust that becomes the basis for behavior. Rather, we strive for security. A life dominated by such striving for security and control of the conditions of our existence means self-love rules us. Sin is our ruler. Self-preservation is normal and natural, but when it proceeds from anxiety and worry, it distorts our behavior with undue self-love. Heidegger provides confirmation that anxiety or dread is an expression of sin.[7] Bultmann will see this as well.[8]

Human brokenness is such that the process of achieving our personal identity becomes a way of revealing the brokenness of human existence. In Heidegger, one can achieve identity by knowing one’s destiny, which one achieves through behavior. One has a certain kind of indebtedness of existence that we find expressed in being responsible. Heidegger describes this experience in terms of human beings owing it to themselves to correspond to this destiny. One is responsible to oneself. To appropriate this thought critically, responsibility to God is a particular form of responsibility to the self. After all, the identity of the self, or the destiny of the self, has its ground in God and one can achieve this destiny only through the power of God.[9]

We can see Heidegger working on the achieving of personal identity in the theme that human existence has its concern for the being that it must be. Human existence is disclosure, for human existence is being-there in the world and is there for itself. We can understand this as an explication of the consciousness of human existence of its own being. As such, Heidegger is correcting the classical philosophical analysis of self-consciousness. For Heidegger, the future about which human existence has concern and which it must be is decisive for its being as a whole. The present being of human existence has its basis in the future with which it has concern to be. He has introduced the time factor into the analysis of self-consciousness that yields its meaning only on the basis that the constitution of human existence is by the future in the whole of its being. As he would put it, the question of personal selfness is accessible only by anticipating the future of one’s own death. The “extreme” place that death has in a human life becomes revelatory way as we “anticipate” that future in all this nothingness. Sartre would later connect this anticipation with the question of God. The point of Heidegger is that as long as human existence is as an entity, it will never reach its wholeness. The gain of its wholeness is the loss of Being-in-the-world. Heidegger has transformed the important notion of self-transcendence as transcendence toward nothingness. The only way out of the questionable quality of human existence is the anticipatory knowledge of the death of the person. The anticipatory knowledge opens the possibility of the certainty of one’s Being. The certainty comes specifically through the call of conscience. The calling is from oneself. Answering the call is the achieving of identity. This ecstatic being-ahead-of-oneself in the future of the person has a positive understanding of the present as moment. The present is the moment in which human existence returns from its future in repetition to its past.[10]

This view of achieving personal identity has several challenges that deserve critical appraisal. One is the material abundance of possibilities of life preceding death apart from knowledge of inescapability of one’s own death. The contingency of events leading up to death argues against Heidegger here. In addition, death does not round out human existence into a whole. Death breaks off life. Even in the best instances, the successful life remains a fragment. We could also say that the intention toward wholeness necessarily reaches beyond death. The intended wholeness transcends the finitude of human life. The web of social life is part of this transcendence. Yet, the reciprocal relation of the social group and the individual suggests a bond that transcends them both that we might call the destiny of humanity. Self-transcendence is toward something rather than nothing. Yet, Heidegger is quite right to point to the importance of anticipation as the means through which humanity experiences its wholeness.[11]

Let us shift our attention to Barth in these matters for a moment. If Heidegger should receive commendation for his introduction of time into human existence, Barth will offer his approach to a critical appropriation of the insight in his attempt to correct it in light of revelation. Barth discusses “the time of revelation,” with the first section becoming a discussion of “God’s time and our time.” To discuss the notion of God revealing whom God is to discuss the occurrence of an event. This means, “God has time for us.” Yet, he gladly points out that he shall not have to take as a basis any time concept gained independently of revelation itself. He rejects the approach of both Augustine and Heidegger. He refers to Being and Time, Section 65. Temporality is “original time” and becomes the possibility of existence in virtue of which one may have anxiety as one lives ecstatically by means of a preliminary resolve to achieve one’s possibility of existence. One attains oneself by facing a guilty past and thereby possessing a present. Existence “is” by bringing to fulfillment of one’s future. Humanity possesses time by creating it. He sees the problem that if we create time, time might be lost. Time in Heidegger becomes a self-determined of human existence. Reality lies with this existence, with temporality as the possibility of existence, but not with time as such. He will go on to discuss his notion of the time of revelation. Heidegger strips time of its objectivity in order to regard it as the way in which human beings exist. We are not sure what we mean by the present, we are not sure if it begins and ends, and we just wonder if we can say anything of time if we do not also speak of eternity.[12]

Barth will also have an important reflection on Nothingness in CD III.3 [50] as he wrestles with evil in creation. In the process, he discusses the role of Nothingness in Heidegger. He will offer his critical appraisal of the term. In Heidegger, Nothing is something in the sense that one has to reckon with it as an original factor that precedes our negation and affirmation. “Nothing” is dynamic and active. It obtrudes upon us. It discloses itself to us in dread, which is the nihilating work of “Nothing” as the rejecting, reprimanding, and elusive being. Dread discloses the previously hidden alienation of the other. Here is the path toward self-hood and freedom. Nothing belongs to the essence of being. Existence derives from manifested nothing. One can define existence as a projection into Nothing. He agrees with Hegel and that pure being and pure nothing are the same thing. We have discussed the disclosure that occurs in affective states like joy and boredom. However, the basic mood that reveals Nothing as constitutive for existence is dread. The revelation of Nothing occurs in dread. Dread reveals nothing because we elude ourselves. Dread strikes us dumb. Revelation of Nothing discloses the strangeness of human existence. Heidegger wants to show the potency of Nothing against existence. Along with dread, Nothing brings peace and rest. Barth will make the point, in fact, that Nothingness has the nature and function of deity. He notes the underived, comprehensive dynamism, and activity of this Nothing. Openness to Nothing is the virtue of existence. Distortion of Nothing is a sin. Nothing exhibits the nature and mode of what philosophy would normally refer to as transcendence. Nothingness in its dominant and dynamic depth takes the place of deity. Nothing is the divine. Nothing is the basis, criterion, and elucidation of everything. He notes that while Nothing has traditional attributes of deity as aseity, uniqueness, omnipotence, omniscience, infinity, and so on, Nothing has no relation to the biblical concept of God. Of course, the notion of Nothing in Heidegger, he says, has nothing to do with what he has considered as nothingness before God. Thus, Nothingness in Heidegger is really something. Nothing is being that has some dimension of the holy and divine. Peace, serenity, and daring, overcome the revelation of Nothing in dread. Nothingness becomes something fruitful, salutary, and radiant rather that something dreadful and horrible or a dark abyss. In this regard, Nothingness in Heidegger is nothing like the Nothingness of Christian usage, where the sickness unto death confronts real nothingness.[13]

Closely related to human brokenness and the difficulty of achieving personal identity is the questionable character of human existence. It suggests perpetual openness of humanity to the future. It suggests the provisional nature of choices and beliefs. For Barth, humanity itself is a question to which the divine is the answer. Barth (Romans, 41) could say that when the final human question awakens in us we receive the divine answer. He sees a correspondence between the question and the divine answer (Romans, 80, 271-2, 380 and The Word of God and the Word of Man, 191). The value of the Law and the multiplicity of religions is that they keep the question open (Romans, 254). He stresses the point that the divine call precedes the question. People call upon God, but God has already answered (Romans, 383). The answer to the question that animates human existence is the personal presence of God. In fact, God has placed us in question precisely because God is the answer to the question of our existence (Romans, 80, 282). He developed this point further in Christliche Dogmatic (1927) by stressing that humanity is the question, but that the divine answer discloses the questionable character of human existence. In fact, the answer awakens the question. Barth will abandon this mode of thinking in Church Dogmatics. He had given up on the possibility of claiming human existence itself as a witness for the truth of revelation. Thus, Barth can say that religion is a confirmation that sin has not destroyed the relation of humanity to God (IV.1, 483).[14] Religion in early dialectical theology is the self-assertion of humanity that feels its lost condition. In contrast, faith is the human response to the self-revelation of God. This contrast between faith and religion was a criticism of the middle class Christian world emerging in Europe. It directed itself against all forms of religion, including that of Christianity.[15]

Bultmann will stress that the very existence of humanity already has the character of a question and is in fact the question of God. Our finitude and self-awareness of it raises the question of Infinity and our relationship to it. Humanity raises the question about itself because God has called humanity into question. God is the answer to the question humanity of itself. He will stress that since humanity is a question to itself it already knows about God. Philosophy knows about faith in that it knows the freedom of human existence, which suggests the questionable character of human existence. Bultmann sees an unobservable, hidden correlation of God and self. Questionableness is the structure of human existence. The self is in quest of itself. He affirms a reciprocal relation between our existence and God. We can know God only as we know self; we can know self only as we know God. Faith provides moral certainty of God. The self arrives at authenticity only in God. Of course, one does not objectify any of this. Only science objectifies the world and the phenomena of the human. Faith allows one to transcend the observable world. Scripture itself arises out of the quest for authentic existence and speaks to our quest for the same. Thus, Bultmann remains faithful to Herrmann in seeing this hidden correlation between God and self. The emphasis of Karl Barth on the Trinity as the self-revelation of God gives way in Bultmann to the disclosing of the authenticity of human existence. In a sense, Bultmann replaces proof of God from nature and history with a proof of God to the believing self and existing authentically. This dialectic between human existence and transcendence has replaced the language of religion that connected soul and God. Its connection with Augustine is that nothing is so certain that we are aware of our existence and therefore know God. This path to knowledge of God from knowledge of self continued in Bernard of Clairvaux. Even John Calvin worked out a dialectic relation between the knowledge of God and self-knowledge. In criticism of this view, we should not it has a weakness that it shares with existentialism in general. We arrive at self-knowledge through participation in the world that science describes.[16]

To be clear, the question contained in human existence is not the answer, for the answer is only through revelation. Humanity has knowledge of God in the uncanniness and enigmatic quality of human existence. The inquiry about God arises from the mystery and finitude of humanity. The question of the authenticity of human existence is always ahead. Human life is always provisional. Yet, Bultmann makes it clear that humanity tries to close the questioning off with a positive knowledge of God, which turns humanity into a prisoner. Christian faith celebrates the question raised in the non-Christian, but must point to the answer divine revelation. Here is the point of contact that Bultmann sees with the existential analysis of human existence. The alliance that Bultmann sees with existentialism points to his difference with Barth.[17]

As a brief aside, the method of correlation in Paul Tillich is close to both Barth and Bultmann. For him, what is at stake in the effort to interpret the Christian revelation as the answer to the question of human existence and of finitude generally is the ability of theological statements to compel conviction. Gerhard Ebeling will take this further, saying theology establishes the possibility of its talk about God having the power to compel conviction by explaining it as an answer to the questionable character of human existence and of reality generally as it confronts humanity. For Barth and Bultmann, this would be true as well.[18]

We should also note that the important notion in Bultmann of “pre-understanding” arises from the questioning character of human existence. The questioning without which we cannot understand the text is the presupposition of understanding. The questioning character of the pre-understanding makes room for a revision of any given pre-conception about the content of a text through a confrontation with the text. However, Bultmann restricts the question about the contemporary significance of the past to that which a transmitted text expresses concerning the question of human existence. This restriction of the text to anthropocentric understanding of existence seems to deny the challenge that the past may present to the present. It assumes the present age is self-sufficient.[19]

We have taken a detour into the importance of humanity as a question. The questionable character of human existence is the reason personal identity is so difficult. The detour highlights an important point. One does not achieve identity so easily. A theological approach may help us consider the place of the existential analysis of human existence.

Mood discloses the manner of human existence in the world and discloses it as a whole. Human existence is this disclosedness. Such disclosure is the openness of human existence to the world. People often read Heidegger at this point as focusing upon the mood of anxiety or despair, which leads to isolation of the self from the community. Yet, he also writes of joy and other positive moods as liberating. Such feelings open the individual to the community.[20] The call of conscience is from the person in the mode of keeping silent. The call is from fallenness into “they” and to its unique potentiality for Being. In this way, he shifts conscience from the awareness of fault. Rather, guilt arises from Being with Others and even from relationship to any law or “ought.” In essence, individuals must bring themselves back from their lostness in “they.” “Being-guilty” is the expression of an ought, the content of which is the authenticity of the individual. Guilt as involving a transgression becomes intelligible in this way. He has recovered the notion of guilt as something we owe to someone or something. Guilt involves awareness of obligation before it involves awareness of transgression. Our responsibility for ourselves arises out of this sense of obligation. This idea is similar to that of Paul Ricoeur (Symbolism of Evil, 102), where he said that acceptance of responsibility is the basis of the consciousness of being an agent or author. The concept of action presupposes the concept of responsibility. Both the capacity for action and the sense of responsibility have their ground in the call to an authentic self. The judgment of conscience is a failure concerning achieving one’s self. I become conscious of something I lack and something I need.

Many of us can appreciate the insight Heidegger brings to self-revelation we experience in mood and in guilt in particular. Yet, in the process, engaging Heidegger critically at this point, Heidegger plays down the consciousness of guilt in the sense of having already violated an obligation and done a wrong that one cannot undo. His analysis fails to penetrate the depth of the nonidentity that makes itself known in awareness of guilt because it fails to see the rupture of communal order by a rending of the ties individuals have to their fellow human beings. Had he done so, he would have seen that the authentic self of an individual is a member of the human order to which it belongs. Had he been aware of this, he might have seen the importance of expiation (extinguishing the guilt incurred for the rupture of community, to put an end to the anger or sorrow that results from this disruption) in overcoming the nonidentity experienced in conscience that one is to accomplish in the life of the injured community. The result is that his analysis of conscience leads to an abstraction of the individual from the human community and its ethos. Heidegger has recognized the subjective form of the judgments of conscience. Yet, it abstracts conscience from all reference to the order of the social world. He has also brought into the coming of consciousness the modern notion of alienation. In fact, the call of conscience locates consciousness in its isolation. It leads into despair. Theologically, the notion of repentance opens the door to overcoming the judgment of conscience and the experience of nonidentity.[21] A different way of putting this objection is that in Bultmann we find the reduction of the Christian ethic to the ethical demand to accept one’s self and take responsibility for the world in general. Such a focus upon the individual at least seems to quit the realm of justice and the social order. It runs the risk of becoming socially irrelevant. In addition, describing the church as a community of faith and a community in the transcendent will not disturb the official doings of society.[22]

To conclude, I think I have shown that Bultmann is much less critical in his approach to Heidegger as are Barth or Pannenberg. Both Barth and Pannenberg engage Heidegger in a critical way. While Barth wants to distance himself from Heidegger, he has also drawn from his insights. Pannenberg is allowing existentialism to inform the Christian notion of sin. Yet, he also makes it clear that the theologian brings Scripture and tradition into dialogue with its insights. I have not included his reflections on how he can biblically bring dread and anxiety into an understanding of the brokenness of humanity. In fact, he will criticize Barth at this point. Barth has an incredibly insightful discussion of sin as pride, sloth, and lying in Volume IV. These reflections on sin have strong connections to Christian tradition. Pannenberg wants to move with Bultmann in re-considering (demythologizing) the doctrine of original sin as directing us to the anxiety or dread that is constitutive of human existence.



[1] (Moltmann, Theology of Hope 1965, 1967), 58-60.
[2] (Barth 2004, 1932-67) Volume I, [2.2] 37; [6.2], 192-3.
[3] (Barth 2004, 1932-67), Volume III.3 [50.3] 334.
[4] (Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective 1985), 19.
[5] (Barth 2004, 1932-67), IV.1, p 389.
[6] (Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective 1985), 91-2.
[7] (Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective 1985), 96-104.
[8] Theology of the New Testament, I, 243-44 on fear in Paul and 241-42 on care.
[9] (Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective 1985), 113-4.
[10] (Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective 1985), 209-11, 234, 237-9.
[11] (Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology (2 Volumes) 1967, 1971), Volume I, 166-7.
[12] (Barth 2004, 1932-67), Vol. I.2 [14.1] 45-47; 47-9.
[13] (Barth 2004, 1932-67) Volume III.3 [50.3] 334-49.
[14] (Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology (2 Volumes) 1967, 1971), Volume II, 207-10.
[15] (Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit: A Conribution to Messianic Ecclesiology 1975, 1977), 154-5.
[16] (Moltmann, Theology of Hope 1965, 1967), 273-6; (Moltmann, The Crucified God 1973, 1974), 87-91; (Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God 1980, 1981), 15.
[17] (Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology (2 Volumes) 1967, 1971), Volume II, 210-2. He refers to Faith and Understanding and Essays Philosophical and Theological. (Moltmann, Theology of Hope 1965, 1967), 59-65, who also refers to Kerygma and Myth.
[18] (Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology (2 Volumes) 1967, 1971), Volume II, 212-3.
[19] (Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology (2 Volumes) 1967, 1971), Volume I, 107-15.
[20] (Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective 1985), 254-6.
[21] (Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective 1985), 301-3, 308-10.
[22] (Moltmann, Theology of Hope 1965, 1967), 314-6, 321.